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A natural measure for the amount of quantum information that a physical system E holds about
another systemA = A1, . . . , An is given by the min-entropy Hmin(A|E). Specifically, the min-entropy
measures the amount of entanglement between E and A, and is the relevant measure when analyz-
ing a wide variety of problems ranging from randomness extraction in quantum cryptography, de-
coupling used in channel coding, to physical processes such as thermalization or the thermodynamic
work cost (or gain) of erasing a quantum system. As such, it is a central question to determine the
behaviour of the min-entropy after some processM is applied to the system A. Here we introduce a
new generic tool relating the resulting min-entropy to the original one, and apply it to several settings
of interest.
• A simple example of such a process is the one of sampling, where a subset S of the systemsA1, . . . , An is selected at random.
The question is then to quantify the entanglement that E has with the selected systems AS , i.e., Hmin(AS |ES) as a function
of the original Hmin(A|E). This has two applications by itself. First, it directly provides the first local quantum-to-classical
randomness extractors for use in quantum cryptography, as well as decoupling operations acting on only a small fraction
AS of the inputA. Moreover, it gives lower bounds on the dimension of k-out-of-n fully quantum random access encodings.
• Another natural example of such a process is a measurement in e.g., BB84 bases commonly used in quantum cryptography.
We establish the first entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information that are nontrivial whenever E is not
maximally entangled with A.
• As a consequence, we are able to prove optimality of quantum cryptographic schemes in the noisy-storage model (NSM).
This model allows for the secure implementation of two-party cryptographic primitives under the assumption that the
adversary cannot store quantum information perfectly. A special case is the bounded-quantum-storage model (BQSM)
which assumes that the adversary’s quantum memory device is noise-free but limited in size. Ever since the inception of
the BQSM [18], it has been a vexing open question to determine whether security is possible as long as the adversary can
only store strictly less than the number of qubits n transmitted during the protocol. Here, we show that security is even
possible as long as the adversary’s device is not larger than n − O(log2 n) qubits, which finally settles the fundamental
limits of the BQSM.
I. INTRODUCTION
A central task in quantum theory is to effectively quantify the amount of information that some system E holds
about some classical or quantum data A. For classical data, i.e., A is a string Xn = X1, . . . , Xn, the min-entropy
Hmin(X
n|E) forms a particularly relevant measure because it determines the length of a secure key that can be ob-
tained from Xn. This is the setting typically considered in quantum key distribution where E is some information
that an adversary Eve has gathered during the course of the protocol, and Xn is the so-called raw key. More pre-
cisely, the maximum number ` of (almost) random bits 1 that can be obtained from Xn that are both uniform and
uncorrelated from E obeys ` ≈ Hmin(Xn|E), if E is classical [33] and quantum [50]. The process by which such
randomness is obtained is known as randomness extraction (see [58] for a survey) or privacy amplification. Classi-
cally, a (strong) randomness extractor is simply a set of functions F = {f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`} such that for almost
all functions f ∈ F , its output f(Xn) is close to uniform and uncorrelated from the adversary, even if he learns
which function was applied. That is, the output is of the form ρF (X)EF ≈ id/2n  ρEF . A well known example
of such a set F is a set of two-universal hash functions which are used in quantum cryptography to turn a raw
key Xn into a secure key f(Xn). The min-entropy also has a very intuitive interpretation as it can be expressed as
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1 We restrict ourselves to bits in the introduction, however, all our results also apply to higher dimensional alphabets.
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n|E) = − logPguess(Xn|E) where Pguess(Xn|E) is the probability that the adversary manages to guess Xn
maximized over all measurements on E [35].
What can we say in the case of quantum data A? It turns out that the fully quantum min-entropy Hmin(A|E)
provides us with a similarly useful way to quantify the amount of information that E holds about A. Its first sig-
nificance is to quantum cryptography where E is again held by an adversary. More specifically, it has been shown
that a quantum-to-classical extractor (QC-extractor) can produce exactly ` ≈ Hmin(A|E) + log |A| classical bits which
are uniform and uncorrelated from E [11]. Instead of applying functions to a classical string, a QC-extractor con-
sists of a set of projective measurements on A giving a classical string as a measurement outcome. Such extractors
form a useful tool in two-party quantum cryptography where one might have an estimate of Hmin(A|E), but not of
the min-entropy of any classical string Xn produced from A. Thus Hmin(A|E) is directly related to the amount of
cryptographic randomness that can be produced from A.
More generally, the min-entropy is of significance in quantum information theory where it quantifies the number
of qubits ofA that can be decoupled fromE [24, 29]. A decoupling operation is given by a quantum operationKA→B
on the system A that (approximately) transforms a state ρAE to τB  ρE , where τB depends only on K but not on ρA.
When τB = id/|B| is the maximally mixed state, the operation KA→B again generates randomness with respect to
E and can hence be understood as a fully quantum-to-quantum extractor (QQ-extractor). When decoupling is used
in quantum information theory, E is typically the environment of a channel NA¯→B acting on half of a maximally
entangled state ΦAA¯, and the number of qubits that can be decoupled relates directly to the number of qubits that
can be transmitted correctly through the channel NA¯→B (see [23] for an in-depth exposition). Recently, the min-
entropy has also gained prominence in related areas such as the study of thermalization [22, 32] and well as the
thermodynamics work cost (or gain!) of erasing a quantum system [21].
It turns out that the fully quantum min-entropy also enjoys a very appealing operational interpretation [35]. More
precisely,
Hmin(A|E) = − log |A| max
ΛE→A¯
F (ΦNAA¯, idA  ΛE→A¯(ρAE))2 , (1)
where F is the fidelity (see below) and ΦN
AA¯
is the normalized maximally entangled state across A and A¯. That is,
Hmin(A|E) measures how close ρAE can be brought to the maximally entangled state by performing a quantum op-
eration on E. Intuitively, this quantifies how close the adversary E can bring himself to being quantumly maximally
correlated with A — exactly analogous to maximizing his classical correlations by trying to guess Xn.
A. Results
Given the significance of the min-entropy in quantum information, it is a natural question to ask how the min-
entropy changes if we apply a quantum operationM toA. More precisely, one might ask how Hmin(M(A)|E) relates
to Hmin(A|E), for some completely positive trace preserving map M. At present, we know that the min-entropy
satisfies Hmin(M(A)|E) > Hmin(A|E) ifM is unital [54]. Can we make more refined statements?
Of particular interest to us is the case where the quantum system consist of n qudits An = A1, . . . , An. Our main
result is to establish the following very general theorem for maps M with the property that we can diagonalize
((M† ◦ M)  idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) = ∑s∈{0,...,d2−1} λsΦs where An = A1, . . . , An, d = |Aj | is the dimension of one of
the individual qudits, ΦAnA¯n is again the unnormalized maximally entangled state, and {Φs}s is a basis for the
space An  A¯n consisting of maximally entangled vectors (see Sections II and Section III for precise definitions
and statement of the theorem). In other words, the unnormalized state ((M† ◦ M)  idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) on AnA¯n has
eigenvalues λs and eigenvectors |Φs〉. In terms of the smooth min-entropy Hεmin, which, loosely speaking, is equal to
the min-entropy except with error probability ε, our first contribution can be stated as
• Main result (Informal) For any partition of {0, . . . , d2 − 1}n = S+ ∪ S− into subsets S+,S− we have
2−H
ε
min(M(An)|E) /
∑
s∈S+ λs2
−Hmin(An|E) + (maxs∈S− λs)d
n.
At first glance, our condition on the mapsMmay seem rather unintuitive and indeed restrictive. Yet, it turns out
that many interesting maps do indeed satisfy these conditions, allowing us to establish the following results.
Entanglement sampling In the study of classical extractors, a goal was to construct families of functions f that are
locally computable [59]. That is, if our goal were to extract only a very small number of key bits from a long string Xn
of length n, one might wonder whether this can be done efficiently in the sense that the functions f depend only on
3a small number of bits of Xn. Classically, a very beautiful method to answer this question is to show that the min-
entropy can in fact be sampled [47, 59]. That is, if we choose a subset S of the bits at random, then the min-entropy of
the bits XS in that subset S obeys
Hmin(XS |ES) ' |S|R(Hmin(Xn|E)/n) , (2)
for some function R. The function R can be understood as a rate function that determines the relation of the original
min-entropy rate Hmin(X
n|E)
n to the min-entropy rate on a subset S of the bits. In other words, min-entropy sampling
says that if Xn is hard to guess, then even given the choice of subset S it is tricky for the adversary to guess XS .
To see why this yields the desired functions f note that one way to construct a randomness extractor would be to
first pick a random subset S, and then apply an arbitrary extractor to the much shorter bit string XS . In the classical
literature, this is known as the sample-then-extract approach [59].
Inspired by the classical results of Vadhan [59], it is a natural question whether there exists QC-extractors which
are efficient in the sense that the measurementsM ∈M only act on a small number of qubits ofAn = A1, . . . , An. Or,
even more generally, whether there exist decoupling operations which depend on only very few qubits. As before,
one way to answer this question in generality is to show that even the fully quantum min-entropy can be sampled -
that is, that entanglement can be sampled.
• Entanglement sampling (Informal) Entanglement sampling is possible for any quantum state ρAnE , i.e.,
Hεmin(AS |ES) ' |S|R(Hmin(An|E)/n) for the rate function R plotted in Figure 1. See Theorem 2 for a pre-
cise statement.
It should be noted that even the case of standard min-entropy sampling of a classical string Xn, but quantum side
informationE has proved challenging. The results of [6] imply that sampling of classical strings is possible when the
distribution over the strings Xn is uniform (i.e., ρXnE = (1/2n)
∑
x∈{0,1}n |x〉〈x| ρxE), and the size of E is bounded,
and [37] has shown that sampling of blocks (but not individual bits) is possible. This was later refined in [63] to
show that bitwise sampling is also possible (see Figure 1 for a comparison of the rate function). Very roughly, the
techniques used in [63] relate the adversary’s ability to guess the string Xn to his ability to guess the XOR of bits in
the string. Clearly, in the case of fully quantum An such techniques cannot be used as it is indeed unclear what the
XOR of qubits even means.
As this is the first result on entanglement sampling, it required entirely novel techniques. More precisely, it in-
spired the even more general theorem sketched above, from which entanglement sampling follows by choosing an
appropriate mapM. As a byproduct, using the same techniques, we also obtain a stronger statement of sampling a
classical string Xn with respect to a quantum system E in the sense that the rate R is improved (see Figure 1 for a
comparison). What’s more, we are able to show an even more precise statement in terms of the entropy H2(An|E)ρ
- without any ε error terms. Classically, this quantity is known as the (conditional) collision entropy. In general, it is
very closely related to the min-entropy, and in fact enjoys a very similar operational interpretation. More specifically,
it can be expressed in the same form as (1) where the optimization over all quantum operations ΛE→A¯n is replaced
by the so-called pretty good recovery map Λpg
E→A¯n which is close to optimal [4].
Application to quantum random access codes Another application of our entanglement sampling result is to the
fully quantum random access codes. Previous works have considered encodings of n classical bits Xn = X1, . . . , Xn
into quantum states ρX
n
E such that any desired bit can be retrieved with a particular success probability p [2, 45].
This was later generalized to retrieving any subset of k bits from the encoding [6]. The goal of [6, 45] was to derive
a bound on the necessary dimension of ρX
n
E as a function of p when the string X
n was chosen uniformly at random.
Here, we prove dimension bounds for encoding n qubits An = A1, . . . , An when we desire to recover any subset of k
qubits with a particular fidelity. Or, read in the opposite direction, we establish a bound on the fidelity as a function
of the dimension (see Section IV C).
Uncertainty relations Another consequence of our main result is a new uncertainty relation with quantum side
information [9] for measurements of n qubits An = A1, . . . , An in randomly chosen BB84 [7] bases. Apart from the
foundational consequences, such relations have found use in verifying the presence of entanglement [49] as well as
in quantum cryptography (see e.g., [11]). Our result establishes the first entropic uncertainty relation with quantum
side-information that uses a high-order entropy like the min-entropy and that is nontrivial as soon as the system
being measured is not maximally entangled with the observerE. In other words, this shows a quantitative bound on
the probability of successfully guessing the measurement outcome that is nontrivial as soon as Hmin(An|E) > −n. 2
2 The fully quantum min-entropy can be negative up to Hmin(An|E) = −n if ρAnE is the maximally entangled state.
4• High-order entropic uncertainty relation for BB84 bases If Xn is obtained by measuring the system An in
a random BB84 bases Θn, we have Hmin(Xn|EΘn) > n · 12γ
(
Hmin(A
n|E)
n
)
, where the function γ is plotted in
Figure 2. See Theorem 10 and Corollary 11 for precise statements.
We also prove uncertainty relations for qudit-wise measurements in mutually unbiased bases in Theorem 12. Again,
these results follow from our very general theorem sketched above, this time for a mapM that represents randomly
chosen measurements.
Applications to the noisy-storage model Our new uncertainty relations have several interesting applications to
cryptography. The goal of two-party cryptography is to enable Alice and Bob to solve tasks in cooperation even if
they do not trust each other. A classic example of such tasks are bit commitment and oblivious transfer. Unfortu-
nately, it has been shown that even using quantum communication, none of these tasks can be implemented securely
without making assumptions [14, 16, 20, 39, 40, 43]. What makes such tasks more difficult than quantum key dis-
tribution is that Alice and Bob cannot collaborate to check on any eavesdropper. Instead, each party has to fend for
itself.
Nevertheless, because two-party computation is such a central part of modern cryptography, one is willing to
make assumptions on how powerful an attacker can be in order to implement them securely. Classically, such as-
sumptions generally take the form of computational assumptions, where we assume that a particular mathematical
problem cannot be solved in polynomial time. Here, we consider physical assumptions that can enable us to solve
such tasks. In particular, can the sole assumption of a limited storage device lead to security [42]? This is indeed
the case and it was shown that security can be obtained if the attacker’s classical storage is limited [15, 42]. Yet,
apart from the fact that classical storage is cheap and plentiful, assuming a limited classical storage has one rather
crucial caveat: If the honest players need to store n classical bits to execute the protocol in the first place, any classical
protocol can be broken if the attacker can store more than roughly n2 bits [25]. Motivated by this unsatisfactory gap,
it was thus suggested to assume that the attacker’s quantum storage was bounded [7, 17–19, 44], or, more generally,
noisy [36, 51, 60]. The central assumption of the noisy-storage model is that during waiting times ∆t introduced in
the protocol, the attacker can keep quantum information only in his noisy quantum storage device; otherwise he is
all-powerful (see Section IV E).
The assumption of bounded or noisy quantum storage offers significant advantages in that the proposed protocols
do not require any quantum storage at all to be implemented by the honest parties. They are typically based on
BB84 [36] or six-state [11] encodings, and indeed the first implementation of a bit commitment protocol has recently
been performed experimentally [46]. So far it was known that there exist protocols that send n qubits encoded in
either the BB84 or six-state encoding, and that are secure as long as the adversary can only store strictly less than n/2
or 2n/3 noise-free qubits respectively.
Using our new techniques, we are able to show security of the primitive called weak string erasure [36] (see Sec-
tion IV E), which in turn can be supplemented with additional classical or quantum communication [64] to obtain
primitives such as bit commitment.
• Application 1: Bounded storage There exists a weak string erasure protocol transmitting n qubits that is secure
as long as the adversary can store at most strictly less than n−O(log2 n) qubits. The protocol does not require
any quantum memory to be executed, and merely requires simple quantum operations and measurements.
See Theorem 15 for a precise statement.
It should be noted that no such protocol can be secure as soon as the adversary can store n qubits, so our result
is essentially optimal. Our result highlights the sharp contrast between the classical and the quantum bounded
storage model and answers the main open question in the BQSM. The noisy-storage model offers an advantage over
the case of bounded-storage not only for implementations using high-dimensional encodings such as the infinite-
dimensional states sent in continuous variable experiments, but allows security even for arbitrarily large storage
devices as long as the noise is large enough. 3 Essentially, the noisy-storage model captures our intuition that security
3 Note that if we have a general noisy storage device F that can be simulated by an m-qubit noiseless channel, then security against a device
that can reliably store at most m qubits readily implies security against the device F . In fact, security in the noisy-storage model does follow
rather directly from security in the bounded-storage model provided the so-called entanglement cost of the storage device is small enough [8,
Lemma 18]. The entanglement cost measures the number of noiseless channels (bounded storage) needed to simulate a certain number of
noisy channels, in the presence of classical communication. However, the entanglement cost of a channel is in general larger than its quantum
capacity. Thus, proving security in the noisy-storage model up to the quantum capacity does not follow directly from proving security in the
bounded-storage model.
5should be linked to how much information the adversary can store in his quantum memory. The first proofs linked
security to the classical capacity [36], the entanglement cost [8] and finally the quantum capacity [11]. The latter
result used a protocol based on six-state encodings.
• Application 2: Noisy storage We significantly push the boundaries regarding when security is possible in the
noisy-storage model (see Section IV E). Furthermore, we link security of a BB84-based protocol to the quantum
capacity of the adversary’s storage device for the first time. See Theorem 14 for a precise statement.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic concepts and notation
In quantum mechanics, a system such as Alice’s or Bob’s labs are described mathematically by Hilbert spaces,
denoted by A,B,C, . . .. Here, we follow the usual convention in quantum cryptography and assume that all Hilbert
spaces are finite-dimensional. We write |A| for the dimension of A. A system of n qudits is also denoted as An =
A1, . . . , An, where we also use |A| to denote the dimension of one single qudit in An. The set of linear operators on A
is denoted byL(A), and we write Herm(A) and Pos(A) for the set of hermitian and positive semidefinite operators on
A respectively. We denote the adjoint of an operator M by M†. A quantum state ρA is an operator ρA ∈ S(A), where
S(A) = {σA ∈ Pos(A) | Tr(σA) = 1}. We will often make use of operator inequalities: whenever X,Y ∈ Herm(A),
we write X 6 Y to mean that Y − X ∈ Pos(A). A quantum operation is given by a completely positive map
M : L(A) → L(C). A mapM is said to be completely positive if for any system B and X ∈ Pos(A  B) we have
(M id)(X) > 0 (see [28] for properties of quantum channels).
Throughout, we use the shorthand [d] = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}. We will follow the convention to use H to denote the
unitary that takes the computational {|0〉, |1〉} to the Hadamard basis: H|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), H|1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
When considering n qubits, we also use Hθ
n
= Hθ1  · · ·Hθn for the unitary defining the basis θn ∈ {0, 1}n.
B. Entropies
Next to its operational interpretation given in (1), the conditional min-entropy of a positive operator ρAB ∈ S(AB)
can also be expressed as
Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
σB∈S(B)
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ with Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ = max
{
λ ∈ R : 2−λ · idA  σB > ρAB} , (3)
where the symbol idA refers to the identity on A. We use the subscript ρ to emphasize the state ρAB of which we
evaluate the min-entropy. The smoothed version is defined by Hεmin(A|B)ρ = maxρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB) Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ , where
Bε(ρ) is the set of states at a distance at most ε from ρ. We use the purified distance as the distance measure [55]. We
refer to [54] for a review of the properties of the min-entropy.
It is simpler to state our results in terms of the related collision entropy defined for any ρAB ∈ Pos(AB) (possibly
unnormalized) by
H2(A|B)ρ = − log
(
Tr
[(
ρ
−1/4
B ρABρ
−1/4
B
)2])
. (4)
We also use the collision entropy conditioned on a general operator σB ∈ S(B),
H2(A|B)ρ|σ = − log
(
Tr
[(
σ
−1/4
B ρABσ
−1/4
B
)2])
. (5)
Note that we do not normalize this quantity by dividing by the trace of the operator ρAB . In fact the quantity
2−H2(A|B)ρ|σ gets multiplied by µ2 when ρ is multiplied by µ ≥ 0.
The two entropy measures Hmin and H2 are closely related as shown in Lemmas 17, 18 and 19. The collision
entropy also has an appealing operational interpretation [10] for normalized ρ as
H2(A|B)ρ = − log
(|A|F (ΦNAA′ , idA  ΛpgE→A′(ρAE))2) , (6)
where F (σ1, σ2) = Tr
(√√
σ1σ2
√
σ1
)
is the fidelity, and ΛpgE→A′ is the pretty good recovery map [4] (see Section C of
the appendix). Finally, we use the binary entropy function h(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x).
6For the curious reader, we note that the quantity (5) has indeed also appeared in a slightly different guise in
the context of norms employed for the study of mixing properties of quantum channels [53]. Specifically, we have
‖ρAB‖22,ω = 2−H2(A|B)ρ|σ with ω = idA  σ−1B for the norm ‖ · ‖2,ω defined in [53].
C. A convenient basis
Throughout, we make use of a very convenient basis of maximally entangled states for the space A  A¯ where
A¯ ' A. The (unnormalized) maximally entangled state
|Φ〉AA¯ =
∑
a
|a〉A  |a〉A¯ (7)
will play an important role in our analysis. Here, the vectors |a〉 label the standard basis of A. We use |ΦN 〉AA¯ to
denote the normalized version |ΦN 〉AA¯ = 1√|A| |Φ〉AA¯. We repeatedly use the following properties. For any operators
X and Y acting on A, we have
Tr[XY ] = Tr[X >(Y )ΦAA¯] (8)
where > denotes the transpose map in the standard basis and ΦAA¯ = |Φ〉〈Φ|AA¯. Moreover, if X : A → C is a linear
operator from A to C we have
(X  idA¯)|Φ〉AA¯ = ∑
a
X|a〉A  |a〉A¯ = ∑
c
|c〉C ∑
a
〈c|X|a〉|a〉A¯ = (idC >(X))|Φ〉CC¯ . (9)
Again, the transpose > is taken with respect to the standard bases {|a〉} and {|c〉} of A and C. Using (8), one can
naturally construct an orthogonal basis of AA¯ by applying unitary transformations to |Φ〉 that are orthogonal with
respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product. Define for s ∈ [|A|2], |Φs〉 = (Ws  id)|Φ〉AA¯ where Ws denote the
generalized Pauli operators (see e.g., [3]), sometimes also called Weyl operators. In fact, all our results would hold
for any unitary operators Ws that are orthogonal with respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product. We again use
Φs = |Φs〉〈Φs|.
In particular for |A| = 2, W0,W1,W2,W3 are the Pauli operators, and we obtain the well-known Bell basis
Φ0 =
 1 0 0 10 0 0 00 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
 , Φ1 =
 0 0 0 00 1 1 00 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
 , (10)
Φ2 =
 0 0 0 00 1 −1 00 −1 1 0
0 0 0 0
 , Φ3 =
 1 0 0 −10 0 0 00 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1
 . (11)
Note that in this numbering scheme, Φ2 is the singlet.
For n > 0, we will denote by An the system
⊗n
i=1Ai, where each Ai is a copy of A. Furthermore, if S ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
we write AS to denote
⊗
i∈S Ai. In other words, A
n consists of n copies of the system A, and AS contains the copies
that correspond to indices in S. In such a setting the dimension of the systemA is denoted d. We can naturally define
for s ∈ [d2]n, |Φs〉 = ni=1|Φsi〉AiA¯i . We then have that { 1√dn |Φs〉}s is an orthonormal basis of AnA¯n. For such strings
s, we denote supp(s) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : si 6= 0} and |s| = |supp(s)|.
III. EVOLUTION OF H2 UNDER GENERAL MAPS
In this section, we derive constraints on the evolution of the conditional collision entropy H2 when the system An
undergoes some transformation described by a completely positive mapM. Our results on entanglement sampling
and uncertainty relations are obtained by evaluating this bound for particular channelsM.
7Theorem 1. Let MAn→C be a completely positive map such that ((M† ◦ M)An  idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) = ∑s∈[d2]n λsΦs and
let ρAnE ∈ S(AnE) be a state, where An = A1, . . . , An is comprised of n qudits of dimension d. Then for any partition
[d2]n = S+ ∪S− into subsets S+ and S−, we have
2−H2(C|E)M(ρ)|ρ
def
= Tr
[(
ρ
−1/4
E (M id)(ρAnE)ρ−1/4E )2]
6
∑
s∈S+
λs2
−H2(An|E)ρ + ( max
s∈S−
λs)d
n. (12)
Note that in the case whereM is µ-trace preserving, i.e.,M†(idA) = µidA, we can directly relate H2(C|E)M(ρ)|ρ to
H2(C|E)M(ρ). In fact, we have TrA[M(ρAE)] = µρE and
2−H2(C|E)M(ρ) = Tr
[(
(µρ)
−1/4
E (M id)(ρAnE)(µρE)−1/4)2] = 1µ2−H2(A|E)M(ρ)|ρ .
A statement for the smooth min-entropy follows directly by applying Lemma 19. In fact, we can first normalize the
stateM(ρ)N =M(ρ)/Tr[M(ρ)], then we obtain for ρ ∈ S(AE),
2−H
ε
min(C|E)M(ρ)N ≤ 2
ε2
· 2−H2(C|E)M(ρ)N |ρ
=
2
ε2 Tr[M(ρ)]2 · 2
−H2(C|E)M(ρ)|ρ
≤ 2
ε2 Tr[M(ρ)]2
 ∑
s∈S+
λs2
−H2(An|E)ρ + ( max
s∈S−
λs)d
n

≤ 2
ε2 Tr[M(ρ)]2
 ∑
s∈S+
λs2
−Hmin(An|E)ρ + ( max
s∈S−
λs)d
n
 .
The mapsM of interest typically have some symmetry. For example, if the mapM is invariant under permutations
of the n systems A1, . . . , An, then the coefficients λs only depend on the type of s, i.e., the number of times each
symbol in [d2] occurs in s. In fact, all of the examples we consider here are such that λs only depends on the weight
|s| = |{i ∈ [n] : si 6= 0}|.
Proof. Let ρ˜AnE = ρ
−1/4
E ρAnEρ
−1/4
E , and let ρ̂AnA¯n = TrEE¯ [(ρ˜AnE  >(ρ˜A¯nE¯))ΦEE¯ ]. Note that ρ̂AnA¯n ≥ 0 and
Tr[ρ̂AnA¯n ] = Tr[ρ˜
2
E ] = 1. Furthermore, define M¯ by M¯(X) = >(M(>(X))) for all X , so that M¯(>(X)) = >(M(X)).
Our first goal is to rewrite H2(C|E)M(ρ)|ρ in terms of the basis {Φs}s. We obtain from (8)
2−H2(C|E)M(ρ)|ρ = Tr[M(ρ˜AnE)2]
= Tr[(M(ρ˜AnE)>(M(ρ˜A¯nE¯)))ΦCC¯  ΦEE¯ ]
= Tr[(M(ρ˜AnE) M¯(>(ρ˜A¯nE¯)))ΦCC¯  ΦEE¯ ]
= Tr[(ρ˜AnE >(ρ˜A¯nE¯))((M†) (M¯†))(ΦCC¯) ΦEE¯ ].
Now write the completely positive mapM in the Kraus representation. There exists linear operators Ki : A → C
such thatM(X) = ∑iKiXK†i . Using (9), we have
(MAn→C  idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) = ∑
i
(Ki  idA¯n)ΦAnA¯n(K†i  idA¯n)
=
∑
i
(idC >(Ki))ΦCC¯(idC >(Ki)†)
= (idC  M¯†)(ΦCC¯).
Thus, we obtain using the definition of ρ̂AnA¯n and the condition onM
2−H2(C|E)M(ρ)|ρ = Tr[(ρ˜AnE >(ρ˜A¯nE¯))((M† ◦M) idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) ΦEE¯ ]
= Tr[ρ̂AnA¯n((M† ◦M) idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n)]
=
∑
s∈[d2]n
λs Tr[ρ̂AnA¯nΦs]. (13)
8We now prove the two key constraints on the terms Tr[ρ̂AnA¯nΦs] we will be using. First, we have a global constraint.
Note that the set of vectors { 1√
dn
|Φs〉}s∈[d2]n forms an orthonormal basis and thus idAnA¯n = 1dn
∑
s∈[d2]n Φs. This
yields ∑
s∈[d2]n
Tr[ρ̂AnA¯nΦs] = d
n Tr[ρ̂AnA¯n ] = d
n. (14)
The second observation concerns the individual terms Tr[ρ̂AnA¯nΦs]. For any s,
Tr[ρ̂AnA¯nΦs] = Tr[ρ̂AnA¯n(Ws  idA¯n)ΦAnA¯n(W †s  idA¯n)]
= Tr[
(
W †s ρ˜AnEWs >(ρ˜A¯nE¯))ΦAnA¯n  ΦEE¯ ]
= Tr[W †s ρ˜AnEWsρ˜AnE)]
6 Tr[ρ˜2AnE ] = 2−H2(A
n|E)ρ ,
using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in the form Tr[XY ] ≤ √Tr[X2] Tr[Y 2] with X = W †s ρ˜AnEWs and Y = ρ˜AnE .
Also, observe that the positivity of ρ̂AnA¯n and Φs implies that Tr[ρ̂AnA¯nΦs] > 0. Thus, we have
0 6 Tr[ρ̂AnA¯nΦs] 6 2−H2(A
n|E)ρ . (15)
Applying inequalities (14) and (15) to (13), we obtain the desired result.
We remark that equations (14) and (15) are the only properties of the operator ρAnE that we are using. This means
that the result would also hold for possible operators ρAnE that do not correspond to states but still satisfy these
conditions.
IV. APPLICATIONS
We now derive several interesting consequences of Theorem 1. All of these follow by making an appropriate
choice for the mapM.
A. Quantum-quantum min-entropy sampling
1. Statement
We now state our results on entanglement sampling. The theorem below deals with the following scenario: we
have n qudits and we choose a subset of them of size k uniformly at random. We have a lower bound on the collision
entropy of the whole state conditioned on some quantum side-information E; the theorem then gives a lower bound
on the conditional collision entropy of the sample. The rate function obtained is plotted in Figure 1 together with an
upper bound on the optimal rate function given by a particular example presented in Theorem 5. The same figure
also shows plots of classical-quantum sampling results that are discussed in Section IV B.
Theorem 2. Let ρAnE ∈ S(AnE) and 1 6 k 6 n, let d = |A| be the dimension of a single system, and let h2 := H2(A
n|E)ρ
n .
Then, we have for n > d2
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ = ES⊆[n],|S|=k2−H2(AS |E)ρ 6 2−kRd(h2)+log(n
2+1), (16)
where Rd(·) is the rate function defined as Rd(x) := − log(d− df−1d (x)), and fd(x) := h(x) + x log(d2 − 1)− log d.
In terms of smooth min-entropy, we have for any ε ∈ (0, 1]
Hεmin(AS |ES)ρ > kRd(hmin)− log(n2 + 1)− log
2
ε2
, (17)
where hmin :=
Hmin(A
n|E)ρ
n .
See Figure 1 for a plot of R2(h2). Note that fd is an increasing function on [0, d
2−1
d2 ] with fd(0) = − log d and
fd
(
d2−1
d2
)
= log d. We can thus define its inverse function f−1d : [− log d, log d]→ [0, d
2−1
d2 ].
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FIG. 1: Plot of our quantum-quantum rate function R2(h2) from Theorem 2 ( ), our classical-quantum rate function C2(h2)
from Theorem 6 ( ), Wullschleger’s min-entropy sampling result [63, Corollary 1] ( ), Vadhan’s purely classical min-entropy
sampling results [59, Lemma 6.2] ( ), and the classical and quantum upper bounds we get from a state that is uniform on
strings of a fixed type analyzed in Theorems 5 and 8 ( , ). As Vadhan’s result requires a choice of parameters we chose
τ = 0.1, which yields a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy, with smoothing parameter of the order of 10−6 for a block size
of n = 10000.
Proof. We start by observing that (16) directly implies (17). This follows from the fact that h2 > hmin (Lemma 17) and
Lemma 19.
We now prove (16) by applying Theorem 1 for an appropriately chosen mapM.
DefineMAn→AkS(X) = 1(nk)
∑
S⊆[n],|S|=k TrSc [X]  |S〉〈S|, for X ∈ L(An), where the second register contains a
classical description of the set S, and Sc denotes the complement of S in [n]. Our first task is to relate this map to the
task of sampling entanglement. We have
2−H2(A
kS|E)M(ρ)|ρ = Tr
[(
ρ
−1/4
E (M id)(ρAnE)ρ−1/4E )2]
= Tr

ρ−1/4E
 1(
n
k
) ∑
|S|=k
ρASE  |S〉〈S|
 ρ−1/4E
2

= 2−H2(ASS|E)ρ
=
1(
n
k
)ES⊆[n],|S|=k Tr [(ρ−1/4E ρASEρ−1/4E )2] = 1(n
k
)2−H2(AS |ES)ρ ,
where for the last equality we used the expression for the entropy conditioned on the classical system S (Lemma
23). This last equality can be seen as a chain rule H2(AY |E) = H2(A|EY ) − log |Y | for states of the form
ρAEY =
1
|Y |
∑
y ρAE(y)  |y〉〈y| with TrA[ρAE(y)] = TrA[ρAE ] for all y. Observe also that we could have chosen
the map MAn→AkS(X) = 1√
(nk)
∑
S⊆[n],|S|=k TrSc [X]  |S〉〈S|, which is not trace preserving, to get more directly
2−H2(A
kS|E)M(ρ)|ρ = 2−H2(AS |ES)ρ and the result would be exactly the same. We preferred to use the physical (i.e.,
normalized) sampling map to make the steps of the proof more transparent.
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Our second task is to show that our choice of map satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. We have
((M† ◦M) idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) =M†
 1(
n
k
) ∑
|S|=k
|S〉〈S| ΦASA¯S  idA¯Sc

=
1(
n
k
)2 ∑
|S|=k
ΦASA¯S  idASc A¯Sc .
We now write this operator in terms of {Φs}s∈[d2]n . Recall that { 1√dn |Φs〉}s forms an orthonormal basis and thus
idAnA¯n =
1
dn
∑
s∈[d2]n Φs:
((M† ◦M) idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) = 1
dn−k
(
n
k
)2 ∑
|S|=k
∑
s:supp(s)⊆Sc
Φs
=
1
dn−k
(
n
k
)2 ∑
s:|s|6n−k
(
n− |s|
k
)
Φs.
As a result, the coefficients λs from Theorem 1 are λs =
(n−|s|k )
dn−k(nk)
2 . Observe that λs only depends on |s| and is a
decreasing function of |s|. In order to apply Theorem 1, it is natural to choose the partition S+ ∪ S− of the form
S+ = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s| 6 `0} and S− = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s| > `0} for a value of `0 ∈ {0, . . . , n} to be chosen as a function of
h2.
Writing equation (12) in our case we obtain,
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ 6
`0∑
`=0
(
n−`
k
)
dn−k
(
n
k
)(n
`
)
(d2 − 1)`2−h2n +
(
n−`0−1
k
)(
n
k
) dk
=
2−h2n
dn−k
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` +
(
n−`0−1
k
)(
n
k
) dk. (18)
Now all that remains is to optimize over `0 and to find a simple expression for this quantity. Before choosing `0, we
simplify the expression above. For the second term, we bound(
n−`0−1
k
)(
n
k
) dk 6 (n− `0 − 1
n
)k
dk.
To obtain a simple bound on the first term, we use the following lemma, which is proven in the appendix.
Lemma 3. For any `0 ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that `0 6 d2−1d2 n where d2 < n, we have
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6 n2
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0max
(
n− `0 − 1
n
,
1
d2
)k
.
It then follows from equation (18) that
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ 6 max
(
n− `0 − 1
n
,
1
d2
)k
dk
(
2−h2n
dn
n2
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0 + 1
)
.
We now determine the value of `0 as a function of h2. Observe that using Lemma 25, we have
(
n
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6
2nh(`0/n)(d2 − 1)`0 = 2nfd(`0/n)dn provided `0 6 d2−1d2 n. We define `0 to be the largest integer that is at most d
2−1
d2 n
such that fd(`0/n) 6 h2. As a result, we have
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ 6 max
(
n− `0 − 1
n
,
1
d2
)k
dk
(
n2 + 1
)
. (19)
Observe also that in the case where the maximum is 1/d2, the result follows directly as Rd(h2) ≤ log d. In the case
where (n−`0−1)/n > 1/d2, we observe that (`0+1)/n > f−1d (h2) by our choice of `0. Note that if `0+1 6 (d2−1)/d2·n,
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this follows from the fact that fd is nondecreasing, and otherwise it follows from the fact that by definition f−1d is
always upper bounded by (d2 − 1)/d2.
We now write
(
n−`0−1
n
)k
in terms of the entropy rate h2:
k log
(
n− `0 − 1
n
)
= k log
(
1− `0 + 1
n
)
6 k log(1− f−1d (h2))
= k log(d− df−1d (h2))− k log d
= −kRd(h2)− k log d.
By plugging these inequalities into (19), we obtain the desired result.
2. An upper bound on the rate function
Note that the rate function obtained in Theorem 2 is independent of the state ρAE and of the size of the sample k.
The objective of this section is to show that with such a requirement, the rate function Rd cannot be improved too
much especially when h2 is close to the minimal value of − log d.
Definition 4. We define the optimal rate function Roptd as
Roptd (h2) := lim infn>1
(
min
k∈[n],ρAnE such that 1nH2(An|E)>h2
1
k
H2(AS |ES)ρ
)
,
where An = A1, . . . , An is comprised of n qudits of dimension d.
We now derive an upper bound on the rate function that will show that our result is fairly close to optimal for
small h2 and small k. The idea is to choose a state that consists of n EPR pairs that have been corrupted by a fixed-
weight generalized Pauli error. In this case, if this weight is small enough, the sample will avoid all the errors with
relatively large probability and the collision entropy of the sampling is going to be much smaller than kh2.
Theorem 5. It holds that Roptd (h2) 6 − log(d− 2df−1d (h2)).
Proof. Let E = Bn ∼= An, and consider the state
ρAnBn =
((
n
w
)
(d2 − 1)w
)−1 ∑
s,|s|=w
Φs
dn
for some particular w. This is a maximally entangled state between An and Bn that has been corrupted by a random
error of weight exactly w. We can compute its collision entropy
2−H2(A
n|Bn)ρ = Tr[ρ−1/2Bn ρAnBnρ
−1/2
Bn ρAnBn ] =
((
n
w
)
(d2 − 1)w
)−2 ∑
s,|s|=w
Tr[idAn ]
=
((
n
w
)
(d2 − 1)w
)−1
dn
6 2−nh(w/n)−w log(d2−1)+n log d+logn.
Hence, h2 > fd(w/n)− 1n log n.
Now, let us compute the collision entropy for a random subsystem of size k with kn → 0. Note that we have
ρASBn =
∑
s∈[d2]S
Pr {σS = s} Φs  idBSc
dn
,
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where σ ∈ [d2]n is a random string of weight exactly w, and σS is the substring index by elements of S. Then we
have
Tr
[(
ρ
−1/4
Bn ρASBnρ
−1/4
Bn
)2]
=
∑
s,s′∈[d2]S
Pr {σS = s}Pr {σ′S = s′}
Tr[ΦsΦs′ ]
dk
= dkPr {σS = σ′S} .
Thus, we want to evaluate the average over S of this probability. For any fixed σ and σ′ of weight w and choosing a
random subset of size k, the corresponding substrings will be the same if they avoid all positions where σ or σ′ are
non-zero. As a result the collision probability for the sample is at least
n− 2w
n
· · · n− 2w − k + 1
n− k + 1 >
(
n− k − 2w
n− k
)k
=
(
1− 2
(w
n
)( n
n− k
))k
>
(
1− 2f−1d
(
h2 +
1
n
log n
)(
n
n− k
))k
.
Taking the limit over n→∞ and kn → 0, we get that
2−H2(AS |E) > (d(1− 2f−1d (h2)))k.
This directly yields the theorem.
3. Applications of entanglement sampling
An immediate consequence of our result on entanglement sampling concerns the existence of decouplers (QQ-
extractors) using only very few qubits. A decoupling operation is some process KA→B that applied to the A system
transforms ρAE to a state that is close to τB  ρE , where τB is a state that depends only on the map K but not
on the initial state ρAE . In quantum information theory, such processes typically consist of applying a random
unitary U to A, followed by a map TA→B such as the partial trace operation. That is, the map K is of the form
K(ρA) =
∫
dµ(U)TA→B(UρAU†) |U〉〈U |, where |U〉 is a classical register containing the choice of unitary.
Decoupling theorems in quantum information theory have their origin in quantum channel coding [1, 29, 31]
where T is usually the partial trace, and τB = id/|B|. In this context, the size of the system |B| that one can decouple
from E, can be related to the number of qubits that one can pass through a quantum channel whose environment is
E with vanishing error. In this context, the choice of unitary U yields an encoding scheme (see [23] for details). More
recently, the decoupling theorem has been generalized to a wide variety of maps T [23, 24].
Decoupling results are known when the unitaries are chosen from the Haar measure [1, 23, 24, 29], from a 2-design,
from an approximate 2-design [52], or from even more efficient sets of unitaries [12]. In contrast, when A is classical,
many decoupling operations are known in the form of randomness extractors discussed in the introduction (see [58]
for a survey). Of particular interest in both computational [29] and physical applications [21, 22, 30, 32] are unitaries
which are efficient. In a computational setting, this generally refers to unitaries that can be implemented using
low-depth quantum circuits, whereas in physical scenarios it is usually of interest that they arise from Hamiltonians
involving only nearest neighbour interactions over a short period of time.
As an example of the physical relevance of decoupling theorems, let us consider the case where A is comprised
of a system Asys and a bath Abath, and T = TrAbath is the operation that traces out the bath. A decoupling theorem
for certain classes of unitaries then says that for very many unitaries in that set, the resulting state of the system
τB is independent of its initial state, one of the steps considered in the process of thermalization [38]. That is, it
tells us that certain evolutions of the system and the bath, namely those corresponding to such unitaries, can lead
to thermalization. This holds even in the stronger sense of relative thermalization where one requires that the state
of the system becomes independent of an observer holding E [22]. In fact, the decoupling theorem [24] for Haar
measure random unitaries can even be used [32] to recover the results of [48] stating that for most initial states of A,
or equivalently most unitary evolutions on A, the resulting state is close to the canonical state.
As such, it is an interesting question to determine which sets of unitaries lead to a decoupling theorem. Here, our
goal is to show that if An = A1, . . . , An consists of n qudits, then there exist decoupling operations involving only
a (small) subset of such qudits. As outlined in the introduction, one generic way to accomplish this task is to show
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that the fully quantum min-entropy can be sampled. Decoupling operations involving only few qudits can then be
obtained in a ”sample-then-decouple” fashion similar to the classical ”sample-then-extract” approach of [59]. That
is, one first samples a set of qubits, and then applies an arbitrary decoupling operation on the resulting sample.
Our result extends to any of the more modern decoupling theorems involving entropy measures [23, 24]. 4 To
illustrate this idea, let us consider the example of An = A1, . . . , An consisting of n qubits, unitaries chosen from the
Haar measure, and T being the partial trace operation Trn−r(ρA) tracing out all but r of the n qubits. In terms of the
H2 entropy is was shown [23, 24] that∫
d(U)
∥∥∥∥Trn−r idE(ρAE)− id2r  ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
6 2− 12 (H2(A|E)+n−2r) , (20)
where ‖ρ − σ‖1 is the trace distance of ρ and σ. If we now first sample a subset of size k of the qubits, then our
sampling result states that for unitaries chosen according to the Haar measure of qubits∫
d(U)
∥∥∥∥Tr|S|−r idE(ρAES)− id2r  ρES
∥∥∥∥
1
6 2−
1
2
[
|S|
(
R2
(
H2(A|E)
n
)
−1
)
−2r−log(n2+1)
]
, (21)
for the rate function given in Theorem 2. Similarly, our sampling result can be applied to the special kinds of
decoupling maps known as quantum-to-classical randomness extractors [11]. In this context, sampling allows the
generation of classical randomness from a quantum system 5 by applying measurements to only a few of the qubits
of A.
B. Classical-quantum min-entropy sampling
1. Statement
Observe that in the case where the system An is classical, i.e., ρAnE =
∑
xn∈[d]n p(x
n)|xn〉〈xn|  ρE(xn) for some
distribution p and states ρE(xn), Theorem 2 can still be applied but in many cases it give trivial bounds. In fact,
when An is classical, we have H2(An|E) > 0 as well as H2(AS |ES) > 0. In order to improve on the lower bound
of Theorem 2 in the case of a classical system, we can apply Theorem 1 to a more specific mapM that measures the
systems AS that are sampled. This allows us to obtain a lower bound on the collision entropy H2(AS |ES) that is
nontrivial for the entire range H2(An|E) ∈ [0, n log d].
Unlike the fully quantum case about which not much was known, the classical-quantum min-entropy sampling
has been previously studied in particular in [6, 37, 63]. We briefly highlight the similarities and differences with
our results in Theorem 6. The work of [6] is restricted to the case where An is uniformly distributed and obtains
a lower bound on the non-smoothed min-entropy 6 of the sample as a function of the dimension of the system E
rather than the conditional entropy. This special case is particularly interesting in the context of random access
codes. The parameters they obtain are better when the dimension of E is small, i.e., h2 is large. However, their
techniques fail to give a nontrivial bound when h2 is small. See Section IV C for more details. The sampling theorem
of [63] works for general classical-quantum states and gives a lower bound on the non-smoothed min-entropy of
the sample. The parameters are illustrated in Figure 1. The work of [37] considers the general classical-quantum
case and focuses on the smoothed min-entropy. This result extends Vadhan’s classical min-entropy sampling [59]
result to the case of quantum side information. Hiding technicalities (like the fact one should sample blocks rather
than bits) and neglecting terms that depend on the smoothing parameters, the rate function they obtain is basically
optimal R(α) = α, 7 as the plot of Vadhan’s result in Figure 1.
Our sampling result has an application to randomness extraction, in that it yields a general way to construct
locally computable extractors even with respect to quantum side information E. This is analogous to the application
of entanglement sampling to decoupling discussed above.
4 In contrast to statements involving only the dimensions of systems as in e.g., [1].
5 Of which we only have a guarantee about the entropy.
6 The fact that the min-entropy is non-smoothed is important for the application to random access codes.
7 To obtain such a result, smoothing is in fact necessary as shown by the example of Theorem 8.
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Theorem 6. Let ρAnE be a classical-quantum state, and 1 6 k 6 n, let d = |A|, and let h2 := H2(A
n|E)ρ
n . Then, for any
n > d,
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ = ES⊆[n],|S|=k2−H2(AS |E)ρ 6 2−kCd(h2)+log(n
2+1),
where Cd(·) is the rate function defined as Cd(α) := − log(1− c−1d (α)), and cd(α) := h(α) +α log(d− 1). In terms of smooth
min-entropy, we have for any ε ∈ (0, 1]
Hεmin(AS |ES)ρ > kCd(hmin)− log(n2 + 1)− log
2
ε2
, (22)
where hmin :=
Hmin(A
n|E)ρ
n .
See Figure 1 for a plot of C2(h2). Note that cd is an increasing function on [0, d−1d ] with cd(0) = 0 and cd
(
d−1
d
)
=
log d. The inverse function c−1d : [0, log d]→ [0, d−1d ] is therefore well-defined.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 2: one uses Theorem 1 with MAn→AkS(X) =
1
(nk)
∑
S⊆[n],|S|=k
∑
xk∈[d]S 〈xk|TrSc [X]|xk〉  |xk〉〈xk|  |S〉〈S|, where {|xk〉}xk∈[d]S is the standard basis of AS . We
then also have in this case 2−H2(A
kS|E)M(ρ)|ρ = 1
(nk)
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ . Moreover, to apply the theorem, we compute
((M† ◦M) idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) = 1(n
k
)2 ∑
|S|=k
(∑
xk
∣∣xk〉〈xk∣∣AS  ∣∣xk〉〈xk∣∣A¯S
) idASc A¯Sc .
Recall that we want to write this operator in terms of Φs = (Ws id)ΦAnA¯n(W †s  id), where Ws = Ws1  · · ·Wsn is
a product of generalized Pauli operators. Let us now assume that the numbering of the Pauli operators is such that
W0, . . . ,Wd−1 are defined as Wy|x〉 = e2piixy/d|x〉 for all x, y ∈ [d]. It then follows that
1
d
∑
y∈[d]
Φy =
1
d
∑
y∈[d]
∑
x,x′∈[d]
e2pii(x−x
′)y/d|x〉〈x′| |x〉〈x′|
=
∑
x
|x〉〈x|A  |x〉〈x|A¯.
As a result, we can write
((M† ◦M) idA¯n)(ΦAnA¯n) = 1(n
k
)2
dn
∑
|S|=k
∑
s∈[d2]n
si∈[d],i∈S
Φs
=
1(
n
k
)2
dn
∑
s:|s|<d6n−k
(
n− |s|<d
k
)
Φs ,
where |s|<d = |{i ∈ [n] : si ∈ [d]}|. As a result, the coefficients λs from Theorem 1 are λs = (
n−|s|<d
k )
dn(nk)
2 , which only
depends on |s|<d and is a decreasing function of |s|<d. As before, it is natural to choose the partition S+ ∪S− from
Theorem 1 of the form S+ = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s|<d 6 `0} and S− = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s|<d > `0} for a value of `0 ∈ {0, . . . , n}
to be chosen as a function of h2. Applying Theorem 1, we have
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ 6
`0∑
`=0
(
n−`
k
)
dn
(
n
k
)(n
`
)
(d2 − d)`dn−`2−h2n +
(
n−`0−1
k
)(
n
k
)
6 2−h2n
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d− 1)` +
(
n− `0 − 1
n
)k
. (23)
To obtain a simple bound on the first term, we use the same Lemma 3 as in the proof of Theorem 2 replacing d2 by d.
Equation (23) then becomes
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ 6 max
(
n− `0 − 1
n
,
1
d
)k (
2−h2nn2
(
n
`0
)
(d− 1)`0 + 1
)
.
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We now determine the value of `0 as a function of h2. Observe that using Lemma 25, we have
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0 6
2nh(`0/n)(d − 1)`0 = 2ncd(`0/n) provided `0 6 d−1d n. We define `0 to be the largest integer that is at most d−1d n such
that cd(`0/n) 6 h2. As a result, we have
2−H2(AS |ES)ρ 6 max
(
n− `0 − 1
n
,
1
d
)k (
n2 + 1
)
. (24)
If the maximum is 1/d, then we directly get the desired result. Now we use the maximality of `0 to say that (`0 +
1)/n > c−1d (h2). Finally,
k log
(
n− `0 − 1
n
)
= k log
(
1− `0 + 1
n
)
6 k log(1− c−1d (h2))
= −kCd(h2).
By plugging these inequalities into (24), we obtain the desired result.
2. An upper bound on the classical rate function
Like in the quantum case, one can find an upper bound for the rate function. Here, our upper bound will even
hold for non-conditional entropy (i.e., when E is trivial).
Definition 7. We define the optimal classical rate function Coptd as
Coptd (h2) := lim infn>1
(
min
k∈[n],ρXnE such that 1nH2(Xn|E)>h2
1
k
H2(XS |ES)ρ
)
,
where Xn = X1, . . . , Xn is comprised of n dits of dimension d.
We will now derive an upper bound on the rate function that will show that our result is fairly close to optimal for
small h2 and small k. We will derive our upper bound by considering the uniform distribution over strings of fixed
Hamming weight. As in the fully quantum case, it will turn out that distributions of small Hamming weight still
have a relatively high h2 compared to the probability of getting a 0 in the sample, and this yields an average entropy
for the sample that is much lower than kh2.
Theorem 8. It holds that Coptd (h2) 6 − log(1− 2c−1d (h2)).
Proof. Let E be trivial, and consider the state
ρXn = |{s, |s| = w}|−1
∑
s,|s|=w
|s〉〈s|
for some particular w. We can compute its collision entropy:
Tr[ρ2Xn ] = |{s, |s| = w}|−1
=
(
n
w
)−1
(d− 1)−w
6 2−nh(w/n)−w log(d−1)+logn.
Hence, h2 > cd(w/n)− 1n log n.
Now, let us compute the collision entropy of the sample when kn → 0. Fix a pair of strings s and s′ with weight w.
Choosing a random subset of size k, the corresponding substrings will be the same if they avoid all positions where
s or s′ are non-zero. As a result the collision probability for the sampled substring is at least
n− 2w
n
· · · n− 2w − k + 1
n− k + 1 >
(
n− k − 2w
n− k
)k
=
(
1− 2
(w
n
)( n
n− k
))k
>
(
1− 2c−1d
(
h2 +
1
n
log n
)(
n
n− k
))k
.
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Taking the limit over n→∞ and kn → 0, we get that
2−H2(AS |E) > (1− 2c−1d (h2))k.
This directly yields the theorem.
C. Dimension bounds for random access codes
One application of our sampling results is to bound the dimension of quantum random access codes. To translate
a result about min-entropy sampling into a result concerning random access codes, one simply considers the system
E to be composed ofm bits or qubits and then considers the special case of a uniform distribution onX1 . . . Xn. That
is, the state ρXnE is of the form
ρXnE =
1
2n
∑
xn∈{0,1}n
|xn〉〈xn| ρxnE . (25)
The quantity of interest when studying a random access encoding of a classical string Xn is the minimal dimension
of E needed to recover any subset of size k of the bits with some desired probability p. Recall the operational
interpretation of the conditional min-entropy Hmin(XS |ES) as the best probability for guessing the bitstring XS
when having access to the system E. Thus, a lower bound on the min-entropy Hmin(XS |ES) directly gives an upper
bound on the probability of successfully recovering a randomly chosen system S of size k. The latter is exactly the
success probability of k-out-of-n random access code as defined in [6].
More precisely, using Lemma 18, Theorem 6 directly leads to a lower bound on the success probability p of k-
out-of-n using m qubits p 6
√
2−kCd(1−m/n)+log(n2+1). Compared to [6], this bound is better when m is close to
n. Specifically, when m/n > 0.721, the technique of [6] does not give any probability bound. On the other hand,
when m/n becomes smaller, their probability bound becomes smaller. k-out-of-n random access codes have also
been studied in [63] and nontrivial upper bounds on the success probabilities are obtained for all values of m. The
exponent of the success probability is illustrated in Figure 1 (note that the plot for Cd should be divided by two to
interpret it as a guessing probability).
One could similarly define fully quantum random access codes. In this setting, we want to store n qudits
A1, . . . , An of information into m qudits so that a subset of k qudits chosen at random can be recovered. Given
n and m, one can define the maximum average fidelity Fn,m,k with which k qudits can be recovered. As before,
our goal will be to bound the dimension necessary to achieve a desired fidelity, or equivalently, establish an upper
bound on the achievable fidelity as a function of the dimension.
Theorem 9. Let n > d2. For any m 6 n and 1 6 k 6 n
F 2n,m,k 6 2−
1
2k(Rd(−mn log d)+log d)+ 12 log(n2+1)
Proof. Let An be the system containing the n qudits to be stored and E be the m qudits of storage. Then, for any
ρAnE , we have H2(An|E) > −m log d. Using Theorem 2 and Lemma 17, we have
2−Hmin(AS |ES)σ = ES⊆[n],|S|=k2−Hmin(AS |E)ρ
6 ES⊆[n],|S|=k2−
1
2 (H2(AS |E)ρ−k log d)
6 2− 12 (kRd(−mn log d)−log(n
2+1)−k log d)
6 2− 12k(Rd(−mn log d)−log d)+ 12 log(n
2+1),
where σAnES = ρAnE  idS(nk) , with S representing the choice of subset of k qudits we want to recover. Now observe
that 2−Hmin(AS |ES) = 2k log d maxEES→A′S F (Φ
N
ASA′S
, idASE(ρES))2. The fidelity term is exactly the maximum fidelity
with which the state on AS can be recovered from the system E.
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FIG. 2: Plot of the function γ(h2) ( ) from Theorem 10 giving a lower bound on the uncertainty of the outcome of BB84
measurement as a function of the entropy rate h2 of the state being measured. For measurements in the six-state bases, the
uncertainty rate function we obtain in Theorem 12 is γ2(h2) ( ). For comparison, we also plot the uncertainty rate function
proved in [11] ( ).
D. High-order uncertainty relations against quantum side-information
Uncertainty relations play a fundamental role in quantum information and in particular in quantum cryptography.
Many of the modern security proofs for quantum key distribution are based on an uncertainty relation [9, 56, 57].
They are also at the heart of security proofs in the bounded quantum storage model [11, 17, 18]. An uncertainty
relation is a statement about a guaranteed uncertainty in the outcome of a measurement in a randomly chosen basis.
We refer the reader to [61] for a survey on uncertainty relations.
1. Uncertainty relation for BB84 measurements
Specifically, here we consider a systemAn of n qubits. Then we measure each one of these qubits in either the stan-
dard basis (labeled 0 with vector |0〉, |1〉) or the Hadamard basis (labeled 1 with vectors |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, |−〉 =
(|0〉 − |1〉)/√2). More precisely, choose a random vector Θn ∈ {0, 1}n and measure qubit i in the basis specified
by the i-th component of Θn = Θ1, . . . ,Θn. Call the outcome Xi. An uncertainty relation is a statement about the
amount of uncertainty in the random variable Xn = X1, . . . , Xn given the knowledge of the basis choice Θn. The
uncertainty is often measured in terms of the Shannon entropy. However, for the applications we consider here, the
measure of uncertainty needs to be stronger, i.e., we should use a higher order entropy like Hmin or H2. Such an
uncertainty relation has been established in [17]:
Hεmin(X
n|Θn) ' n/2. (26)
The way this uncertainty relation was used in the context of the bounded storage model was to apply a chain rule
to (26) to obtain Hεmin(X
n|EΘn) ' n/2 − log |E|. There are two reasons for this inequality to be unsatisfactory: it
depends on the dimension of E rather than on the correlations between An and E, and it becomes trivial when
H2(A
n|E) < −n/2 as this implies log |E| > n/2.
It is simple to see that if the system An is maximally entangled with some system E, then the outcome Xn of
this measurement can be perfectly predicted by having access to E. In other words, if the conditional entropy
H2(A
n|E) = −n, then Xn can be correctly guessed with probability 1. The following theorem provides a converse:
if H2(An|E) > −(1 − ε)n for ε > 0, then Xn cannot be guessed with probability better than 2−nδ(ε) with δ(ε) > 0
whenever ε > 0.
Theorem 10. Let ρAnE ∈ S(AnE) where An is an n-qubit space and define h2 = H2(A
n|E)ρ
n . Then we have
H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ > nγ(h2)− 1
where ρXnEΘn = 12n
∑
xn∈{0,1}n,θn∈{0,1}n |xn〉〈xn|〈xn|Hθ
n
ρAnEH
θn |xn〉  |θn〉〈θn| is the state obtained when system An
is measured in the basis defined in the register Θn and the function γ is defined by
γ(h2) =
{
h2 if h2 > 1/2
g−1(h2) if h2 < 1/2.
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with g(α) = h(α) + α− 1.
Proof. We apply Theorem 1 withMAn→XnΘn = Nn where N (ρ) = 12 ∑x∈{0,1},θ∈{0,1} |θ〉〈θ|  |x〉〈x|〈x|HθρHθ|x〉.
We have
2−H2(X
nΘn|E)M(ρ)|ρ = Tr
[(
ρ
−1/4
E (Nn  id)(ρAnE)ρ−1/4E )2]
=
1
4n
∑
θn∈{0,1}n
Tr

ρ−1/4E ∑
xn∈{0,1}n
|θn〉〈θn| |xn〉〈xn|〈xn|HθnρAnEHθn |xn〉ρ−1/4E
2

=
1
2n
2−H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ ,
where in the last line we used the expression for the entropy conditioned on a classical system (Lemma 23).
We then evaluate the state
(N † ◦ N  id)(Φ) = 1
4
(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|+ |++〉〈++|+ |−−〉〈−−|)
=
1
4
(
Φ0 +
1
2
Φ1 +
1
2
Φ3
)
,
where Φi are defined in Equations (10) and (11). 8 In the notation of Theorem 1, we have for the map M and for
s ∈ {0, 1, 3}n, λs = 14n · 12|s| . For s /∈ {0, 1, 3}n, λs = 0. As a result, when applying Theorem 1, it is natural to choose
the partition S+ ∪ S− of the form S+ = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s| 6 `0} and S− = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s| > `0} for a value of
`0 ∈ {0, . . . , n} to be chosen as a function of h2. We obtain for any `0
2−H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ 6
`0∑
`=0
(
n
`
)
2−h2n−n + 2−`0−1δ`0≤n−1 , (27)
where δ`0≤n−1 = 1 if `0 ≤ n− 1 and 0 if `0 = n. If h2 > 1/2, let `0 = n, in which case we obtain a bound of
2−H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ 6 2−h2n.
If h2 < 1/2, then we are going to choose `0 6 n/2. Define the function g(α) = h(α) + α− 1 and let α0 6 1/2 be such
that g(α0) = h2. We then choose `0 = bα0nc. As a result,
`0∑
`=0
(
n
`
)
2−h2n−n 6 2n(h(`0/n)−h2−1)
6 2n(h(α0)−h2−1) = 2n(−α0+1+h2−h2−1) = 2−α0n,
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 25. In addition, we have 2−`0−1 6 2−α0n. Using these bounds in (27), we
obtain in this case
2−H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ 6 2−α0n+1.
Taking the logarithm leads to the desired result.
The following corollary expresses the uncertainty relation described in Theorem 10 in terms of min-entropies,
which will be more convenient for the cryptographic applications.
Corollary 11. Using the same notation as in Theorem 10, we have
Hmin(X
n|EΘn)ρ > 1
2
(nγ(h2)− 1) (28)
> 1
2
(nγ(hmin)− 1). (29)
8 Note that Φ2 is the projector on the anti-symmetric subspace and hence cannot appear in this decomposition.
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where hmin =
Hmin(A
n|E)ρ
n . Moreover, for any ε ∈ (0, 1], we have
Hεmin(X
n|EΘn)ρ > nγ(h2)− 1− log 2
ε2
. (30)
Proof. To obtain (28), observe that Hmin(Xn|EΘn)ρ > 12H2(Xn|EΘn)ρ, using Lemma 18. To replace h2 by hmin, we
use the corresponding lower bound in Lemma 17. To obtain (30), we use Lemma 19.
2. Uncertainty relation for measurements in MUBs
Consider a systemAn of n qudits and consider a full set of d+1 mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) in dimension d. A
set of bases are said to be mutually unbiased if for any pair of vectors |v〉, |w〉 in two different bases, we have |〈v|w〉| =
d−1/2. We then measure each one of these qudits in a randomly chosen basis from this set. More precisely, choose a
random vector Θn ∈ [d+ 1]n and measure qudit i in the basis specified by the i-th component of Θn. Let Uθn be the
unitary that transforms the basis θn into the standard basis. We prove an uncertainty relation for these measurements
in the presence of quantum side information. Previously, uncertainty relations for these measurements taking into
account possible quantum side information were proven in [11]. The main improvement here is that the uncertainty
lower bound is nontrivial for any h2 > − log d. Specifically, for entropy rates h2 < −(log(d + 1) − 1), this theorem
provides the first nontrivial uncertainty rates for single-qudit measurements in MUBs. However, when h2 is close to
0, the bound of [11] is better than the one provided here. See Figure 2 for a comparison.
Theorem 12. Let ρAnE ∈ S(AnE) where An is an n-qudit space and define h2 = H2(A
n|E)ρ
n . Then we have
H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ > nγd(h2)− 1,
where ρXnEΘn = 1(d+1)n
∑
x∈[d]n,Θn∈[d+1]n |x〉〈x|〈x|UθnρAnEU†θn |x〉  |θn〉〈θn| is the state obtained when system An is
measured in the basis defined in the register Θn and
γd(h2) =
{
h2 if h2 > d−1d log(d+ 1)
f−1d (h2) log(d+ 1) if h2 <
d−1
d log(d+ 1)
with fd(α) = h(α) + α log(d2 − 1)− log d defined as in Theorem 2.
Proof. We apply Theorem 1 with MAn→XnΘn = Nn where N (ρ) = 1d+1 ∑x∈[d],θ∈[d+1] |θ〉〈θ|  |x〉〈x|〈x|UθρU†θ |x〉.
Analogous to the proof of Theorem 10, it is simple to see that 2−H2(X
nΘn|E)M(ρ)|ρ = 1(d+1)n 2
−H2(Xn|EΘn)ρ . We have
in this case
((N † ◦ N ) id)(Φ) = 1
(d+ 1)2
∑
θ∈[d+1],x∈[d],i,j∈[d]
〈x|Uθ|i〉〈j|U†θ |x〉 U†θ |x〉〈x|Uθ  |i〉〈j|
=
1
(d+ 1)2
∑
θ∈[d+1],x∈[d]
U†θ |x〉〈x|Uθ  ∑
i,j∈[d]
〈x|Uθ|i〉〈j|U†θ |x〉 |i〉〈j|
=
1
(d+ 1)2
∑
θ∈[d+1],x∈[d]
U†θ |x〉〈x|Uθ >(U†θ |x〉〈x|Uθ),
where Φ is the unnormalized maximally entangled state across two qudits, and> denotes the transpose with respect
to the standard basis. Now we use the fact that the states {Uθ|x〉}θ∈[d+1],x∈[d] form a state two-design [34]:∑
θ∈[d+1],x∈[d]
U†θ |x〉〈x|Uθ  U†θ |x〉〈x|Uθ = idAA¯ + FAA¯,
where FAA¯ denotes the swap operator F =
∑
x,x′∈[d] |x〉〈x′| |x′〉〈x|. As (id>)(F ) = Φ, we have
(N † ◦ N  id)(Φ) = 1
d+ 1
· id + Φ
d+ 1
=
1
d+ 1
(
Φ0
d+ 1
+
∑
s∈[d2] Φs
d(d+ 1)
)
=
1
d(d+ 1)
(
Φ0 +
∑
s 6=0 Φs
d+ 1
)
.
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This means that for the n-fold tensor product M = Nn, we have using the notation of Theorem 1 that λs =
1
(d+1)ndn
1
(d+1)|s| for all s ∈ [d2]n. As a result, when applying Theorem 1, it is natural to choose the partitionS+ ∪S−
of the formS+ = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s| 6 `0} andS− = {s ∈ [d2]n : |s| > `0} for a value of `0 ∈ {0, . . . , n} to be chosen as a
function of h2. We obtain for any `0,
2−H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ 6
`0∑
`=0
(
n
`
)
(d2 − 1)`2−h2n(d+ 1)−`d−n + (d+ 1)−`0−1δ`06n−1
=
`0∑
`=0
(
n
`
)
(d− 1)`2−nh2−n log d + (d+ 1)−`0−1δ`06n−1, (31)
where δ`06n−1 = 1 if `0 6 n− 1 and 0 otherwise. If h2 > d−1d log(d+ 1), let `0 = n, in which case we obtain a bound
of
2−H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ 6
n∑
`=0
(
n
`
)
(d− 1)`2−nh2−n log d = 2−h2n.
If h2 < d−1d log(d + 1), then we are going to choose `0 6
d−1
d n. Note that fd(
d−1
d ) =
d−1
d log(d + 1). As h2 <
d−1
d log(d+ 1) and fd is nondecreasing on [0, (d− 1)/d], we can find α0 6 (d− 1)/d be such that fd(α0) = h2. We then
choose `0 = bα0nc. As a result,
`0∑
`=0
(
n
`
)
(d− 1)`2−h2n−(log d)n 6 2n(h(`0/n)+`0/n log(d−1))−n(h2+log d))
6 2n(h(α0)+α0 log(d−1)−h2−log d)
= 2n(−α0 log(d+1)+log d+h2−h2−log d) = (d+ 1)−α0n,
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 25. In addition, we have (d+ 1)−`0−1 6 (d+ 1)−α0n. Using these bounds
in (27), we obtain in this case
2−H2(X
n|EΘn)ρ 6 2(d+ 1)−α0n.
Taking the logarithm leads to the desired result.
The following corollary expresses the uncertainty relation described in Theorem 12 in terms of min-entropies. The
proof is the same as Corollary 11.
Corollary 13. Using the same notation as in Theorem 12, we have
Hmin(X
n|EΘn)ρ > 1
2
(nγd(h2)− 1) (32)
> 1
2
(nγd(hmin)− 1) . (33)
where hmin =
Hmin(A|E)ρ
n . Moreover, for any ε ∈ (0, 1], we have
Hεmin(X
n|EΘn)ρ > nγd(h2)− 1− log 2
ε2
. (34)
E. Security in the noisy-storage model
1. General noisy storage model
We now use our new uncertainty relations to prove that the primitive weak string erasure can be secure as soon as
one of the parties has a memory that cannot reliably store n qubits. In weak string erasure, the objective is to generate
a string Xn such that Alice holds Xn and Bob holds a random subset I ⊆ [n] and the bits XI of Xn corresponding
to the indices in I . Randomly chosen here means that each index i ∈ [n] has probability 1/2 of being in I . The
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security criterion is that at the end of the protocol, a cheating Bob should have a state satisfying Hmin(Xn|B) > λn
where B represents Bob’s system, and a cheating Alice should not learn anything about I . To summarize all relevant
parameters, we speak of an (n, λ)-WSE scheme and refer to [36] for a definition 9. It is proved in [36] that bit
commitment can be implemented using weak string erasure and classical communication.
Protocol. The protocol we use here is the same as the one of [36]. Alice prepares a random string Xn ∈ {0, 1}n and
encodes each bit Xi in either the standard basis Θi = 0 or the Hadamard basis Θi = 1, each with probability 1/2.
Then Bob measures these qubits in randomly chosen bases Θ′i. After the waiting time, Alice reveals bothX
n and Θn.
The set I is defined by I = {i : Θi = Θ′i}. For a more detailed description of the protocol, we refer the reader to [36].
To state the result, we first define the notion of channel fidelity introduced by [5] which is perhaps the most widely
used quantity to measure how good a channel is at sending quantum information. For a channelN : S(Q)→ S(Q′),
the channel fidelity Fc quantifies how well N preserves entanglement with a reference:
Fc(N ) = F (ΦNQ′A, [N  idA] (ΦNQA)), (35)
where ΦNQA is a normalized maximally entangled state. For example, one way of defining the (one-shot) quantum
capacity with free classical forward communication of a channel FB→C is by the maximum of log |Q| over all encod-
ings E : S(Q)→ S(B M) and decodings D : S(C M)→ S(Q′) such that Fc(D ◦ (F  idM ) ◦ E) > 1− ε for small
enough ε. Here idM refers to a noiseless classical channel.
The following theorem states that as soon as the storage device of Bob cannot send quantum information with
reliability better than η, then we can perform two-party computation securely provided η 6 2−δn for any δ > 0. One
can even obtain security when η 6 2−c(log2 n+logn log(1/ε)) for some large enough constant c. Previously, this was only
known when η < 2−(2−log 3)n [11].
Theorem 14. Let Bob’s storage device be given by F : S(Hin)→ S(B), and let η ∈ (0, 1). Assume that we have
max
D,E
Fc(D ◦ (F  idM ) ◦ E)2 6 η (36)
where the maximum is over all quantum channels E : S ((C2)n)→ S(Hin M) and D : S(B M)→ S((C2)n).
Then, the protocol described above implements a (n, λ)-WSE for
λ =
1
2
(
γ (−1 + log(1/η)/n)− 1
n
)
.
Proof. The proof of correctness of the protocol, and security against dishonest Alice is identical to [36] and does not
lead to any error terms.
For the security against dishonest Bob, it is convenient to imagine a purification of the protocol, in which Alice
prepares n EPR pairs ΦNAnQ, where she sends Q to Bob and later measures her n qubits A
n in randomly chosen
BB84 bases. Bob’s general attack is illustrated in Figure 3. We use the uncertainty relation in Equation (29), with
E = BMΘn on ρAnBMΘn . In order to do that, we first derive a lower bound on hmin =
Hmin(A
n|BMΘn)ρ
n . Note that
because Θn is independent of AnBM , we have Hmin(An|BMΘn)ρ = Hmin(An|BM)ρ. We now use Condition (36) to
obtain a lower bound on Hmin(An|BM).
In fact, we use an operational interpretation of the conditional min-entropy due to [35]:
Hmin(A
n|BM)ρ = − log |An| max
ΛBM→A¯n
F (ΦNAnA¯n , idAn  Λ(ρAnBM ))2 , (37)
where ΦN
AnA¯n
is the normalized maximally entangled state across AnA¯n. That is, the min-entropy is directly related
to the “amount” of entanglement between An and BM . The map Λ in (37) can be understood as a decoding attack
D aiming to restore entanglement with Alice.
Further, note that the expression in (37) is the same as
max
D,E
F
(
ΦNAnB , idAn  [D ◦ (F  idM ) ◦ E] (ΦNAnQ)) = maxD,E Fc(D ◦ (F  idM ) ◦ E) . (38)
9 Note that the original definition includes a security error ε, which in our case is ε = 0.
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FIG. 3: An attack of dishonest Bob is described by an encoding attack E and a guessing attack because for classical Xn the min-
entropy Hmin(Xn|BMΘn) is directly related to the probability that Bob guesses Xn. The uncertainty relation of (33) is going to
allow us to relate this guessing probability to how well a decoding attack D can preserve entanglement between Alice and Bob,
where D acts on BM .
By the assumption on the storage device F , we obtain that for any encoding E and decoding D attack of Bob
Hmin(A
n|BM)ρ > − log 2nFc(D ◦ (F  idM ) ◦ E)2
> − (n− log(1/η)) .
Then, using the uncertainty relation of (29), we obtain
Hmin(X
n|BMΘn)ρ ≥ 1
2
(nγ (−1 + log(1/η)/n)− 1) ,
which proves the desired result.
2. Special case: bounded storage model
The next theorem simply states the result in the important special case of the bounded storage model.
Theorem 15 (WSE in the bounded storage model). If Alice has q qubits of quantum memory then the protocol described in
the previous section implements (n, λ)-WSE with λ = 12
(
γ(−q/n)− 1n
)
.
Proof. The proof is the same as Theorem 14, but we can now directly obtain a lower bound on H2(An|BM)ρ > −q
using Lemma 23. By (28), we have
Hmin(X
n|BMΘn)ρ ≥ 1
2
(nγ(−q/n)− 1).
Previously, in this case, security was only proven when q < 2n3 [41] with a variant of this protocol that uses a
six-state encoding. Using the estimate in Claim 24, the previous theorem shows that q < n − c log2 n for some large
enough c would be sufficient to perform WSE securely. Using the construction of [36], this leads to a secure bit
commitment provided q < n− c log2 n− c log n log(1/ε) for some large enough constant c and where ε is the failure
probability.
V. CONCLUSION
We have determined a bound on how the min-entropy changes when A is transformed to M(A) for a certain
general class of processesM. Our results on entanglement sampling, as well as uncertainty relations with respect to
23
quantum side information then follow naturally for different choices ofM. Our results on entanglement sampling
have in fact already found applications in the context of studying properties of random quantum circuits [12].
One important aspect of our results compared to previous works on uncertainty relations and quantum random
access codes is to give nontrivial bounds for all the range of possible min-entropy of the input. However, for some
specific ranges of the input entropy, other techniques lead to better rates. It would be interesting to see if it is possible
to combine our techniques with ideas from previous work such as [11] for uncertainty relations or [6] for random
access codes to obtain tight bounds. It is likely that other interesting statements can be made using Theorem 1 for
different maps, and it is an interesting open question to extend our results to more general maps.
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Appendix A: Technical Lemmas
Lemma 3. For any `0 ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that `0 6 d2−1d2 n where d2 < n, we have
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6 n2
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0max
(
n− `0 − 1
n
,
1
d2
)k
.
Proof. It is convenient to study separately the case where `0 6 d
2−1
d2 (n − k) and the case where `0 > d
2−1
d2 (n − k).
More precisely, the following claim introduces the value k0 that separates these two cases.
Claim 16. There exists k0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that `0 6 d2−1d2 (n− k0 + 1) such that
1. for k 6 k0,
∑
`6`0
(
n−k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6 n · (n−k`0 )(d2 − 1)`0 ,
2. and
∑
`6n−k0
(
n−k0
`
)
(d2 − 1)` = (d2)n−k0 6 n · (n−k0`0 )(d2 − 1)`0 .
Proof. We have for ` > 1, (
n−k
`
)
(d2 − 1)`(
n−k
`−1
)
(d2 − 1)`−1 = (d
2 − 1)n− k − `+ 1
`
.
Now define `max(k) to be the largest integer such that `max(k) 6 d
2−1
d2 (n − k + 1). In this case, we have for ` 6
`max(k), (d2 − 1)n−k−`+1` > 1. As a result, we have that for a fixed k, the expression
(
n−k
`
) (
d2 − 1)` is increasing for
` 6 `max(k). In addition, if ` > `max(k), then ` > d
2−1
d2 (n − k + 1) which means that for ` > `max(k), the expression(
n−k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` is decreasing.
We choose k0 to be the largest integer such that `0 6 d
2−1
d2 (n − k0 + 1). Note that such a k0 exists because we
assumed `0 6 d
2−1
d2 n. This means that `0 >
d2−1
d2 (n−k0) > d
2−1
d2 (n−k0 + 1)−1. This implies that `0 = `max(k0) is the
maximum of
(
n−k0
`
) (
d2 − 1)` over ` ∈ {0, . . . , n − k0}. Both points then follows from bounding the sum by n times
the largest term.
As a result, we have for k 6 k0,
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6 n ·
(
n− k
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0
= n ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0 (n− `0) · · · (n− `0 − k + 1)
n · · · (n− k + 1) .
Note that for k = 1, the result simply follows from the fact that n−`0−1 > 1, which itself comes from our assumptions
`0 6 d
2−1
d2 n and d
2 < n. For k > 1, we can continue with
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6 n ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0(n− `0) (n− `0 − 1) · · · (n− `0 − k + 1)
n · · · (n− k + 1)
6 n2 ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0
(
n− `0 − 1
n
)k
.
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For k > k0,
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6 d2(n−k)
6 n ·
(
n− k0
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0d−2(k−k0)
= n ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0 (n− `0) · · · (n− `0 − k0 + 1)
n · · · (n− k0 + 1)
(
1
d2
)k−k0
. (A1)
For k0 > 1, we use the fact that `0 6 d
2−1
d2 (n− k0 + 1), which implies that 1d2 6 n−`0−k0+1n−k0+1 . Thus,
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` 6 d2(n−k)
6 n ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0 (n− `0) · · · (n− `0 − k0 + 1)
(k−k0)+1
n · · · (n− k0 + 1)(k−k0)+1
6 n ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0(n− `0)
(
n− `0 − 1
n
)k
6 n2 ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0
(
n− `0 − 1
n
)k
.
For k0 = 1, (A1) becomes
`0∑
`=0
(
n− k
`
)
(d2 − 1)` ≤ n ·
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0 n− `0
n
(
1
d2
)k−1
≤ n2
(
n
`0
)
(d2 − 1)`0
(
1
d2
)k
,
using the assumption n > d2.
Appendix B: Some useful properties of entropy measures
Lemma 17. Let ρAB ∈ S6(AB). Then, Hmin(A|B)ρ 6 H2(A|B)ρ 6 2Hmin(A|B)ρ + log dA.
Proof. The first inequality can be proven as follows:
2−Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
EAB :EB=idB
Tr[EABρAB ]
> Tr[(ρ−1/2B ρABρ
−1/2
B )ρAB ]
= 2−H2(A|B)ρ .
For the second inequality, we proceed as follows. By [35], there exists a CPTP map EB→A′ with A′ ∼= A, such that
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Hmin(A|B)ρ = Hmin(A|A′)E(ρ). Letting ρ˜ = E(ρ) and ωA′ =
√
ρ˜A′/Tr[
√
ρ˜A′ ], we get
2−Hmin(A|B)ρ = 2−Hmin(A|A
′)ρ˜
6 2−Hmin(A|A′)ρ˜|ω
=
∥∥∥ω−1/2A′ ρ˜AA′ω−1/2A′ ∥∥∥∞
=
∥∥∥ρ˜−1/4A′ ρ˜AA′ ρ˜−1/4A′ ∥∥∥∞ Tr[√ρ˜A′ ]
6
∥∥∥ρ˜−1/4A′ ρ˜AA′ ρ˜−1/4A′ ∥∥∥
2
Tr[
√
ρ˜A′ ]
=
√
2−H2(A|A′)ρ˜|ρ˜ Tr[
√
ρ˜A′ ]
6
√
2−H2(A|B)ρ Tr[
√
ρ˜A′ ]
6
√
dA2−H2(A|B)ρ ,
and the lemma follows.
Lemma 18. Let ρXB ∈ S6(XB) be a CQ state. Then
Hmin(X|B)ρ 6 H2(X|B)ρ 6 2Hmin(X|B)ρ.
Proof. The lower bound is a special case of Lemma 17. For the upper bound, from the operational interpretation of
Hmin, we get that there exists a measurementMB→X′ such that Hmin(X|B)ρ = Hmin(X|X ′)M(ρ). Using this, we get
that
2−Hmin(X|B)ρ = 2−Hmin(X|X
′)M(ρ)
= EX¯′2−Hmin(X|X
′=X¯′)M(ρ)
6 EX¯′2−
1
2 H2(X|X′=X¯′)M(ρ)
6
√
EX¯′2−H2(X|X
′=X¯′)M(ρ)
=
√
2−H2(X|X′)M(ρ)|M(ρ)
6
√
2−H2(X|B)ρ .
where the first inequality follows from an application of Cauchy-Schwarz, the second from the concavity of the
square root, and the third from the monotonicity of H2 under CPTP maps. The last equality is due to the following:
EX¯′2−H2(X|X
′=X¯′)M(ρ) =
∑
x′
Pr {X ′ = x′}
∑
x
Pr {X = x|X ′ = x′}2
= Tr[
(
(idX  ρ−1/4X′ )ρXX′(idX  ρ−1/4X′ ))2]
= 2−H2(X|X
′)M(ρ)|M(ρ) .
Lemma 19. Let ρAB ∈ S6(AB) and σB ∈ S≤(B). Then, H2(A|B)ρ|σ 6 Hεmin(A|B)ρ|σ + log 2ε2 ≤ Hεmin(A|B)ρ + log 2ε2 .
This lemma is very similar to Theorem 7 in [55], but note that they use a slightly different definition of H2. The
proof of this version of the lemma is, therefore, very similar to theirs.
Proof. Let ∆ = (ρAB − 2−Hεmin(A|B)ρ|ρ idA  σB)+ (where (·)+ denotes the nonnegative part of an operator). Let λ > 0
be such that Hεmin(A|B)ρ|σ > − log λ and ε =
√
2 Tr[∆] (such a λ exists by Lemma 15 of [55]). Furthermore, let P be
the projector onto the support of ∆. We then have that
PρABP > λP (idA  σB)P
(PσBP )
−1/2PρABP (PσBP )−1/2 > λPAB ,
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where we have omitted the idA’s in the second line. Using this, we get that
ε2
2
= Tr[∆]
= Tr[P (ρAB − λidA  σB)P ]
6 Tr[PρABP ]
6 λ−1 Tr[PρABP (PσBP )−1/2PρABP (PσBP )−1/2]
= λ−12D2(PρABP‖P (idAσB)P )
6 λ−12D2(ρAB‖idAσB)
6 2Hεmin(A|B)ρ|σ−H2(A|B)ρ|σ ,
where D2 is defined in Definition 20 and the next to last inequality is due to Theorem 21.
Definition 20. Let D2(X‖Y ) be defined as
2D2(X‖Y ) := Tr[(Y −1/4XY −1/4)2].
Theorem 21. D2(E(X)‖E(Y )) 6 D2(X‖Y ) for any CPTP map E .
Proof. Consider the map (L,R) 7→ LR−1/2L  R−1/2. Theorem 5.14 in [62] shows that it is jointly operator convex,
by taking g(R) = R1/2 (R1/2)> (which is operator concave by [62, Corollary 5.5, point 1]), h(L) = L id, f(x) = x2.
This entails that (L,R) 7→ Tr[R−1/2LR−1/2L] is also jointly operator convex, via the fact that
Tr[R−1/2LR−1/2L] = Tr[Φ(LR−1/2L (R−1/2)>)].
We now invoke Theorem 5.16 from [62] on this functional to conclude the proof.
Defining H2(A|B)ρ|σ naturally as H2(A|B)ρ|σ = Tr
[(
σ
−1/4
B ρABσ
−1/4
B
)2]
, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 22. Let ρAB ∈ S6(AB) and σB ∈ S6(B) such that ρB is in the support of σB . Then, for any CPTP map EB→C ,
we have that H2(A|B)ρ|σ 6 H2(A|C)E(ρ)|E(σ).
Lemma 23. Suppose ρ ∈ S(AQC) is such that theC system is classical, i.e., ρAQC =
∑
c p(c)|c〉〈c|ρcAQ for some probability
distribution p and orthogonal vectors {|c〉}c in C. Then
H2(A|QC)ρ = − log
∑
c
p(c)2−H2(A|Q)ρc .
In particular H2(A|QC) > − log |Q|.
Proof. We have
Tr
[(
idA  ρ−1/4QC ρAQC idA  ρ−1/4QC )2]
= Tr
(idA  (∑
c
p(c)|c〉〈c| ρcQ)−1/4
(∑
c
p(c)|c〉〈c| ρcAQ
)
idA  (∑
c
p(c)|c〉〈c| ρcQ)−1/4
)2
=
∑
c
Tr
[(
idA  (p(c)ρcQ)−1/4ρcAQidA  (p(c)ρcQ)−1/4)2]
=
∑
c
p(c) Tr
[(
idA  (ρcQ)−1/4ρcAQidA  (ρcQ)−1/4)2] .
To conclude the proof, we simply observe that Tr
[(
idA  (ρQ)−1/4ρAQidA  (ρQ)−1/4)2] 6 Tr[idA  ρ−1Q ρAQ] =
Tr[ρ−1Q ρQ] = |Q|.
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The following claim gives a bound on the function γ from Theorem 10 for small values of h2.
Claim 24. Write h2 = −1 + x with x 6 1/3, then we have
γ(−1 + x) > x
10 log(1/x)
.
Proof. Recall that γ is the inverse of g(x) = h(x) + x− 1. We have
g
(
x
10 log(1/x)
)
= h
(
x
10 log(1/x)
)
+
x
10 log(1/x)
− 1
6 2 · x
10 log(1/x)
log
10 log(1/x)
x
+
x
10 log(1/x)
− 1
6 x
5 log(1/x)
(
log 10 + log log(1/x) + log(1/x) +
1
2
)
− 1
6 x− 1,
which proves the desired result.
Lemma 25. Let a be a positive integer. We have for any `n 6
a
a+1 ,
∑`
k=0
(
n
k
)
ak 6 2nh(`/n)a`
Proof. See for example [26], Lemma 5.
Appendix C: Operational interpretation of H2
When X is classical, then it is already known [13] that
H2(X|E) = − logP pgguess(X|E) ,
where P pgguess is the guessing probability using the pretty good measurement which performs very well [27]. For
completeness, we here include the arguments of [10] regarding the operational interpretation of H2 for quantum
informationA. Like the min-entropy, it is a natural measure of the entanglement betweenA andB in that H2(A|B) =
− log[|A|F pg(A|B)2] with
F pg(A|B) = F (ΦNAA′ , idA  ΛpgB→A′(ρAB)) , (C1)
and ΛpgB→A′ is the pretty good recovery map [4]. To see this, we note that the pretty good recovery map can be written
as
ΛpgB→A′(·) =
1
|A| · E
†
B→A′
(
ρ
−1/2
B (·)ρ−1/2B
)
,
where E†B→A′ denotes the adjoint of the Choi-Jamiolkowski map of ρAB ,
EA→B(·) = |A| · TrA
[(
(·)T  idB) ρAB] .
Putting this in (4) we arrive at (C1). The map ΛpgB→A′ is pretty good in the sense that it is close to optimal for
recovering the maximally entangled state, i.e., the following bound holds [4]
F 2(A|B) 6 F pg(A|B) 6 F (A|B) ,
where F (A|B) is the fidelity achievable by the optimal map given in (1).
